Predatory pricing Lecture 6

Dr. Martin Ewers

April 18, 2014



Table of contents

1. Definition

2. Welfare effects

3. Credibility

Section 1

Definition

Definition

Definition (Predatory pricing)

- 1. Price is low, meaning
 - ► strict criterion: P < MC
 - ► weak criterion: *P* < *AC*
- 2. The price is intended either
 - to drive competitors out of the market, or
 - ► to deter market entry by potential rivals.

Section 2

Welfare effects

Welfare effects

Welfare effects of predatory pricing

- ► Initial low price (price war) is beneficial to consumers.
- ► If price increases due to lack of competition, consumers will loose.

Section 3

Credibility

Is a price suitable to drive competitors out of the market or to deter market entry by potential rivals?

The chain store game helps to analyse.

Chain store game – payoff matrix. Single-round game: Firm C has the $1^{\rm st}$ move, I makes the $2^{\rm nd}$ move

	C – market entry	C – no market entry
/ – fight	(70;-10)	(90; <u>0</u>)
/ – accommodate	(<u>80;10</u>)	(<u>100</u> ; <mark>0</mark>)

Nash equilibrium: No player can do better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy.

	C – market entry	C − no market entry
/ – fight		
/ – accommodate	Nash equilibrium	
	·	

In a single-round game, market entry will take place.

Chain store game - finite number of rounds

The incumbent *I* can not credibly threat to lower prices ('fight') in response to market entry.

Proof by reverse induction:

- Assume there is a finite number n of rounds ('subgame').
- lacktriangle In the *n*-th round, *I* will accommodate anyway (subgame equilibrium, see payoff matrix)
- lacksquare I cannot credibly threat in the (n-1)-th round to set low prices in the n-th round.
- Accordingly I will stick to the subgame equilibrium in the (n-1)-th round.

Predatory pricing can work despite the chain store paradox.

- ► Infinite number of rounds.
- ► Incumbent *I* can bear more losses over more subgames than any rival firm *C*.
 - Does I have the ressources to take losses?
 - Does C have the ressources to take losses?
- Rival firms do not know I's payoff matrix (they can only guess).
 - It might make sense I to invest in building a reputation.